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Abstract
In a model of career concerns for experts, when is a principal hurt from observing more
information about her agent? This paper introduces a distinction between information on
the consequence of the agents action and information directly on the agents action. When
the latter kind of information is available, the agent faces an incentive to disregard useful
private signals and act according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori. This
conformist behavior hurts the principal in two ways: the decision made by the agent is less
likely to be the right one (discipline) and ex post it is more di¢ cult to evaluate the agents
ability (sorting). The paper identies a necessary and su¢ cient condition on the agent
signal structure under which the principal benets from committing not to observe the
agents action. The paper also shows the existence of strategic complementarities between
information on action and information on consequence. The results on the distinction
between action and consequence are then used to interpret existing disclosure policies in
delegated portfolio management. In particular, they are consistent with hitherto puzzling
evidence that mutual funds systematically overperform pension funds.
1 Introduction
There is a widespread perception, especially among economists, that agency relationships
should be as transparent as possible. By transparency, we mean the ability of the principal
to observe how the agent behaves and what the consequences of such behavior are. The
idea is that transparency improves accountability, which in turn aligns the interests of the
agent with those of the principal. Holmström [12] has shown that in moral hazard prob-
lems more information about the agent is never detrimental to the principal, and, under
mild assumptions, it is strictly benecial. Should one conclude that whenever it is tech-
nologically feasible and not extremely expensive the principal should observe everything
that the agent does?
Before asking what the optimal policy is, let us note that in practice we observe sys-
tematic deviations from full transparency in agency relationships in delegated portfolio
management, corporate governance, and politics.
In delegated portfolio management, one might expect a high degree of transparency be-
tween the principal (the fund manager) and the agent (the investor). Instead, investors are
typically supplied with limited information on the composition of the fund they own. Cur-
rently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission requires disclosure every six months,
which consists of a portfolio snapshot at a particular point in time and can easily be ma-
nipulated by re-adjusting the composition just before and after the snapshot is taken a
practice known as window dressing. It would be easy and almost costless to have more
frequent disclosure by requiring mutual funds to publicize their portfolio composition on
the internet. Yet there is strong resistance from the industry to proposals in the direction
of more frequent disclosure (Tyle [29]).
In corporate governance, violations to the transparency principle are so widespread that
some legal scholars argue that secrecy is the norm rather than the exception in the relation
between shareholders and managers (Stevensons [28, p. 6]): Corporations  even the
largest among them have always been treated by the legal system as privateinstitutions.
When questions about the availability of corporate information have arisen, the inquiry
has typically begun from the premise that corporations, like individuals, are entitled to
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keep secret all information they are able to secure physically unless some particular reason
for disclosure [...] could be adduced in support of a contrary rule. So deeply embedded in
our world view is this principle that it is not at all uncommon to hear serious discussions
of a corporate right to privacy.
In politics, the principle of open government has made great inroads in the last decades
but there are still important areas in which public decision-making is, by law, protected
by secrecy. In the United States, the executive privilegeallows the president to with-
hold information from the Congress, the courts, and the public (Rozell [26]). While the
executive privilege cannot be used arbitrarily and fell in disrepute during the Watergate
scandal, the Supreme Court recognized its validity (US vs. Nixon, 1974). In the European
Union, the most powerful legislative body, the Council, has a policy of holding meetings
behind closed doors and not publishing the minutes. Over thirty countries have passed
Open Government codes, which establish the principle that a citizen should be able to
access any public document. There are, however, important types of information, such as
pre-decision material, that are often exempt from this requirement (Frankel [10]).1
Are the observed deviations from transparency in some sense optimal, or are they just
due to ine¢ cient arrangements, that survive because of institutional inertia or resistance
from entrenched interests? To answer this question, we need to establish what arguments
can be made against transparency.
One obvious candidate explanation is that information revealed to the principal would
also be revealed to a third party who will make use of it in ways that hurt the principal. In
the political arena, voters may choose to ignore information pertaining to national security
to prevent hostile countries from learning them as well. In the corporate world, sharehold-
ers may wish to keep non-patentable information secret rather than risk that competitors
learn it. In delegated portfolio management, real time disclosure could damage a fund
because its investment strategy could be mimicked or even anticipated by competitors.2
1Section 5 returns to these non-disclosure policies and re-interprets them in the context of the present
model.
2However, the SEC proposed reform allows for a time lag usually sixty days that is judged to be
su¢ cient to neutralize free riding and front running.
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The third-party rationalefor keeping information secret presumably entails a tradeo¤
between damage from information leaks and weaker incentives for the agent. This paper
will instead look for an agency rationale: a desire for secrecy that stems purely from
incentive considerations. The conjecture is that in some circumstances revealing more
information about the agent makes the agents interest less aligned with the principals
interest. Holmströms [12] results on the optimality of information revelation in moral
hazard problems suggest that the agency rationale should be explored in contexts in which,
for exogenous reasons, there is no full contracting on observables. We will focus our
attention on career concern models (Holmström [13]), in which the principal and the agent
can sign only short-term non-contingent contracts.3
The agency literature has already identied instances in which more information can
hurt the principal. Holmström [13] noted that more precise information about the agents
type reduces the incentive for the agent to work hard in order to prove his worth. De-
watripont, Jewitt and Tirole [6] present examples in which the agent works harder if the
principal receives a coarser signal on agent performance rather than observing performance
directly. Crémer [4] shows that in a dynamic contracting model where renegotiation is pos-
sible the principal may be hurt by observing a precise signal on agent performance because
it makes the commitment to non-renegotiation less credible. In these three instances, more
information is bad for discipline (the agent works less) but it is good for sorting (it is easier
to identify agent type).
The rationale for secrecy considered in the present paper is entirely di¤erent. It does
not hinge on the risk that the agent exerts less e¤ort, like in the papers above, but rather
on the possibility that the agent disregards useful private signals. In a nutshell, we show
that the availability of a certain kind of information may induce the agent to behave in a
conformist way. This hurts the principal both through discipline (the agents action is less
aligned with the principals interest) and sorting (it is impossible to discern the agents
ability). In the following paragraphs, we provide a brief, informal description of the model
3As Gibbons and Murphy [11] show, there are still strong career concern incentives even when contracts
are contingent on observables. Thus, the crucial assumption we make is that long-term contracts are not
available.
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